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INTRODUCTION

The body of John, the owner of a local restaurant, was found on the
floor of his restaurant's kitchen. He had been shot dead. A large-scale
police investigation ensued and was covered extensively by the local
media. In a public statement made a week after John's body had been
found, the District Attorney announced that the lead suspect in John's
murder was Rex, the owner of another local restaurant. Rex and John
had had a sordid history with one another and, although the police did
not yet have enough evidence to arrest Rex for the murder, the DA
expressed that Rex was their prime suspect. Following the DA's
comments, John's father, Alex, held a press conference and implored
anyone with information that could lead to Rex's arrest to go to the
police immediately. During the press conference Alex referred to Rex as
"a bad man" and "evil" and stated that Rex had "always been out to get
John." The following day, Rex filed a lawsuit against Alex alleging that
Alex had defamed him.
Is Alex liable for defamation? Should he be? In this author's
opinion, the answer to both of these questions should be unequivocally
"no." A law enforcement official identified Rex as a suspect in John's
murder (a controversy that drew significant public attention). Alex's
comments simply expressed agreement with the District Attorney and
called for others to aid the police in their investigation. In other words,
Alex was exercising his rights under the First Amendment to comment
on, and speak freely about, a public issue. If Alex was exercising his
First Amendment rights, then certainly he cannot be liable for
defamation. Can he?
Under the current state of defamation law, the answer to this
question is far from clear. Pursuant to long-standing Supreme Court
precedent, a defamation plaintiff who is adjudged to be a public official
or public figure must prove that a defendant acted with "actual malice"
before prevailing against that defendant in a suit for defamation.' But if
a defamation plaintiff is merely a private figure, then that plaintiff need
only prove negligence to recover against a defendant for defamation.2
1. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (discussing public
officials); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Betts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (addressing public
figures). A defendant acts with "actual malice" in the defamation context when he speaks with
"knowledge that [the statement] [is] false or with reckless disregard of whether it [is] false or
not." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) ("We hold that, so long as they
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
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Since actual malice is extremely difficult to prove, the determination of
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public or private figure is often
outcome determinative.
Thus, the key question in Rex's defamation suit is whether he is a
public figure. But the answer to this question is not straightforward.4
One does not become a public figure simply by breaking the law,5 and
this Article does not dispute this rule as a general proposition. Certainly
the child who steals a gumball from the candy store or even the petty
shoplifter who steals a pair of shoes from the department store are not
considered public figures. But what about a case like Rex's, where a law
enforcement official makes a public statement identifying an individual
as a prime suspect in a criminal investigation? Is such a proclamation
sufficient to convert that individual into a public figure for the limited
purpose of commentary on that individual's involvement in the criminal
investigation? This Article argues that it is.
In order to sufficiently answer this question, another highly
contested defamation law question must first be discussed. In order for
an individual to become a public figure, that individual must play a
substantial role in some sort of public controversy.6 Typically, that
person will have become involved in the public controversy voluntarily.
Herein lies the problem with determining Rex's public figure status: he
certainly has not become involved in the DA's criminal investigation
voluntarily. Thus the question becomes: Can one become a public figure
involuntarily? While the Supreme Court has suggested that the answer
to this question is "yes," it has never definitively ruled on the matter. In
the wake of the this uncertainty, some courts have adopted the

standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual.").
3. As one commentator notes, "[t]he importance of resolving [the] question [of whether
a defamation plaintiff is a public or private figure] . . . is more than merely academic.

..

. As

negligence is far easier to prove, status as a public figure necessarily makes it much harder for a
plaintiff to prevail and recover any damages. Aureliano Sanchez-Arango, The Casenote: The
Elusive "Involuntary Limited PurposePublic Figure:" Why the Fourth Circuit got it Wrong in
Weklls v. Liddy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 211, 213 (2000).

4. Compare Ruebke v. Globe Commc'ns, 738 P.2d 1246 (Kan. 1987) (holding that a
suspect in triple homicide is a public figure for purposes of his defamation suit against
newspaper that reported on his involvement in the murders), with Stokes v. CBS Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (D. Minn. 1998) (suggesting that a TV station could be liable for negligently
reporting that wife was suspected of husband's murder even though the police deputy in charge
of the murder investigation had previously said in a public statement that wife was the only
suspect in husband's murder).
5. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
6. See infra Part Ill.A.
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) ("[I]t may be possible for
someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own.").
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involuntary public figure doctrine, while others have rejected it.' This
Article argues in favor of the involuntary public figure doctrine because
it is necessary to adequately protect First Amendment rights.
The First Amendment guarantees to all American citizens the right
to freely comment on matters of public concern. In order to ensure that
this right is not chilled, individuals who have been publicly identified as
criminal suspects by law enforcement officials should be held to be
involuntary public figures. Some states already implicitly agree with
this proposition by dismissing lawsuits that inhibit citizens from freely
commenting on matters of public interest.10 But the protection of
citizens' constitutional rights should not-and indeed does not-depend
on state laws. This Article argues that the Supreme Court should
formally recognize as involuntary public figures individuals who are
publicly identified by law enforcement officials as criminal suspects.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews and discusses the
evolution of U.S. defamation law in the Supreme Court, be inning with
the watershed case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' This Part
concludes by explaining that the Court's opinions have never precluded
the existence of involuntary public figures and in fact lend support to
the doctrine. Part II turns its attention to lower court opinions that deal
with cases of involuntary public figures. Although some courts and
commentators have expressed doubts as to whether one can ever
become a public figure involuntarily, this Part argues that, at least in a
limited range of circumstances, the First Amendment demands that
defamation plaintiffs can become public figures involuntarily. Part III
then returns to the question posed in this Introduction: is an individual
who has been publicly identified by a law enforcement official as a
suspect in a criminal investigation an involuntary public figure? This
Part answers this question in the affirmative.
I. SUPREME COURT DEFAMATION CASES

The law of defamation is grounded firmly in society's "great
tradition of reverence for reputation."l 2 As the Supreme Court has aptly
noted, "[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a

8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part III.C.1.

11.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

12.

1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION

§

1.1 (2d ed. 2012).
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concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."" In 1964,
the Court's "constitutionalization" of defamation law began with its
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.14
A. The Supreme Court and Defamation:New York Times to Gertz
The Sullivan case revolved around an advertisement that the New
York Times ran on March 29, 1960. The ad charged Alabama state
authorities with instituting "a wave of terror" against non-violent
African American protestors.15 The Commissioner of Public Affairs for
Montgomery County, Alabama, sued the paper for defamation and was
awarded $500,000 at trial.16 The jury was instructed that "the statements
in the advertisement were 'libelous per se"' and was also instructed that
it could presume that the New York Times had acted with malice.17
These instructions were upheld by the Supreme Court of Alabama.' 8
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instruction
requiring malice to be presumed posed a significant risk of forcing
"self-censorship" upon critics of official conduct.19 Such a rule would
"dampen[] the vigor and limit[] the variety of public debate" and thus
have an impermissible chilling effect on citizens' rights to comment on
matters of public concern. 20 To avoid such a result, the Court ruled that
public officials may not recover damages for "defamatory falsehood[s]
relating to [their] official conduct unless [they] prove[] that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 2 1
13.
14.
(1964).
15.
16.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990).
SMOLLA, supra note 12, §§ 1.1, 2.1; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-57.
For additional background on the facts leading up to the Sullivan case and the

proceedings in the trial court, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW 9-33 (1991). $500,000 was

an "enormous" libel award in 1960; indeed, it was the largest in Alabama history at the time. Id.
at 35. Considering the Times faced five nearly identical suits over the same ad, it faced potential
liability of over $3 million, an amount that at that point in the paper's history likely would have
ruined it. Id
17. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 262-63. At the time, Alabama law held statements that "tended
to injure a person in his reputation or to bring him into 'public contempt"' were libelous per se.
SMOLLA, supra note 12, § 2:3. This was actually consistent with the majority of state defamation
laws at the time. Id.
18. Id. at 263.
19. Id. at 279.
20. Id. See also id at 270 ("[We have] a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."); SMOLLA, supra note 12, § 2:3 ("Justice Brennan ... spoke of the necessity of
fashioning libel rules that do not chill the free exercise of public criticism.").
21. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
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The Court would later apply this standard to all public figures. 22
Ten years after New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court decided Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.23 Gertz involved an attorney, Gertz, who
represented the family of a murder victim against the victim's murderer,
a Chicago policeman, in a civil suit. Gertz never discussed the
policeman with the media and was not involved in the criminal
prosecution. Despite this, the magazine American Opinion ran an article
during the civil trial alleging that Gertz had helped frame the policeman
and implied that Gertz had a criminal record. 24 Gertz sued the magazine
for libel. By the time the case reached trial, it was undisputed that all the
article's allegations against Gertz were false. 25 The district court entered
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the magazine,
finding that Gertz needed to prove actual malice and had failed to do so.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that Gertz was a private
figure. The Court began by attempting to draw a bright line between
public and private figures, holding that public figures must prove actual
malice, while states are free to allow private figures to satisfy a lesser
standard so long as it is something more than strict liability. 26 This rule
balances the need to protect First Amendment rights with the
"legitimate state interest" in protecting citizens' right to protect their
"good name." 27 Since this case, virtually all state courts have held that
this ruling means that private figures must only prove negligence. 2 8
The Court justified its holding on two grounds. First, it reasoned that
self-help is the first recourse available to defamation victims. Since
public figures typically enjoy significant access to "channels of
22. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). A plurality of the Court briefly
adopted a different standard in 1971, holding that the New York Times standard should apply to
any speech involving matters of "public or general interest." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). The Court departed from this standard a few years later in Gertz.
23. 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) ("This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the
proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press
protected by the First Amendment. With this decision we return to that effort.").
24. Id. at 325-26.
25. Id. at 326.
26. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-52. See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., 443
U.S. 157, 164 (1979) (noting that the New York Times actual malice standard was applied to
public figures in Gertz).
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
28. See, e.g., Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 183 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) ("The central issue presented by this appeal is whether Jewell, as the plaintiff in this
defamation action, is a public or private figure . ... Plaintiffs who are 'private persons' must
only prove that the defendant acted with ordinary negligence." (internal citations omitted));
SMOLLA, supra note 12, § 3:88 ("The Court's opinion in Gertz did not actually use the word
'negligence.' . .. Across the country, however, lower courts interpreted the 'fault' requirement
as establishing negligence as the minimum standard of culpability that the first amendment
would tolerate in a suit by a private figure subject to Gertz.").
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effective communication," they can more easily combat and respond to
defamatory statements.2 9 Public figures thus require less protection than
private individuals, who have much less ability to publicly respond to
defamatory comments and thus are more vulnerable.3o
Second, the Court reasoned that public figures require less protection
from defamation laws than do private figures because public figures
have assumed the risk of "closer public scrutiny" by stepping into the
public arena. 3 1 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that there
are two ways an individual can become a public figure. There are those
who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they
are deemed public figures for all purposes." 32 But more often, one is a
public figure for purposes only of "public controversies" they have
"thrust themselves to the forefront" of "in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved." 33 In other words, they are a "limitedpurpose public figure." 34
Taking account of these two considerations, the Court ruled that
Gertz was not a public figure. He certainly had not attained a position of
"such persuasive power and influence" that he was a public figure for
all purposes.3 5 Further, although the trial of the Chicago policeman for
murder was arguably a public issue, Gertz "plainly did not thrust
himself into the vortex of this public issue." 36 He was not involved in
the criminal prosecution and discussed neither the criminal nor civil
cases with the media. His only involvement in the issue was as an
attorney for a private litigant. As such, the Constitution did not require
Gertz to satisfy the actual malice standard in order to prevail in his libel
suit.
Although the issue was not before it, the Court also briefly addressed
the question of whether one can ever become a public figure
involuntarily. The Court's opinion suggests that such a result is
possible, noting that "it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances
of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." 37 Te
opinion also stated that "an individual [becomes a public figure when
he] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
(applying
identified
35.
36.
37.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979)
the term "limited-purpose public figure" to the second class of public figures
in the Gertz opinion).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 345.
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controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of
issues."3 In the years following Gertz, this language has sparked much
debate over whether, and if so when, an individual can involuntarily
become a public figure.39 The Court has had several opportunities to
expound upon the possibility of involuntary public figures, but has
declined to ever do so. 40 Despite this, analysis of these cases remains
important to establish that the Court has never rejected the idea of an
involuntary public figure.
B. The Supreme Court andDefamation: Firestone,
Hutchinson,and Wolston
The first defamation case the Court heard following its ruling in
Gertz was Time, Inc. v. Firestone.41 Mary Alice Firestone had married
Russell Firestone of tire company fame in 1961. In 1964, they went
through a highly-publicized divorce that took more than three years to
finalize.4 2 Following the entry of final judgment in the Firestones'
divorce trial, Time magazine published an article stating that Russell
had been granted divorce from Mary Alice "on grounds of extreme
cruelty and adultery," 43 an allegation unsupported by the divorce court's
final judgment. Mary Alice sued Time for libel and was victorious both
at trial and on appeal.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Time argued that Mary Alice was a
public figure. The Court rejected this argument. She did not "assume
any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society .. . and she did
not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it."44 Further,
Mary Alice was not involved in a "public controversy." Divorce
proceedings, no matter how newsworthy, are not the sort of "public
controversy" New York Times and Gertz sought to protect.45 Not all
38. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
39. Compare Sanchez-Arango, supra note 3, at 221 ("[Flar from killing the involuntary
public figure doctrine, [Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston] merely illustrate[] that
voluntariness is merely the principal route to public figure status."), with David L. Wallis, Note,
The Revival of Involuntary Limited-Purpose Public Figures-Dameron v, Washington
Magazine, Inc., 1987 BYU L. REv. 313, 317-18 ("In light of these three cases, the existence of
an involuntary public figure is hypothetical at best. The Court stated in Firestone, Hutchinson,
and Wolston that the public figure status is contingent on voluntary involvement.").
40. See infra Part I.B.
41. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
42. "The 17-month trial and related events attracted national news coverage, and elicited
no fewer than 43 articles in the Miami Herald and 45 articles in the Palm Beach Post and Palm
Beach Times." Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 452 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 453.
45. Id. at 454.
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matters of public interest are deserving of the heightened actual-malice
standard of New York Times.46 A holding to the contrary would harken
back to the public-interest rule of Rosenbloom that the Court overruled
in Gertz.47 As such, Time could be held liable for publishing falsehoods
about Mary Alice upon a showing of negligence.
Three years after Firestone, the Court handed down decisions in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire48 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,
Inc.4 9 In Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist who conducted
psychological studies on monkeys for governmental agencies such as
NASA and the Navy sued Proxmire, a U.S. Senator who "awarded"
NASA and the Navy a "golden fleece" award for wasteful government
spending in connection with Hutchinson's studies.o Proxmire discussed
this award on TV and radio programs and also mentioned it in a
newsletter that reached over 100,000 people. Hutchinson sued Proxmire
for libel.
The Supreme Court held that Hutchinson was not a public figure. 52
Hutchinson did not "thrust himself or his views into public controversy
to influence others."5 3 Although government expenditures are a matter
of public concern, not everyone who receives a governmental grant "can
be said to have invited that degree of public attention and comment ...
essential to meet the public figure level.5 4
The Court also recognized the "bootstrapping" issue raised by this
case, noting that any public controversy Hutchinson was arguably
involved in was caused by Proxmire's awarding of the golden fleece to
the institutions for which Hutchinson worked.5 "Clearly, those charged
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense
by making the claimant a public figure." 56
Finally, in Wolston, Reader's Digest published a book about Soviet
espionage in post-World War II America. 7 The book stated that
Wolston had been indicted for espionage and that Wolston was a

46. Id.
47. See supratext accompanying note 23.
48. 443 U.S. Ill (1979).
49. Id. at 157.
50. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 114-16.
51. Id. at I18.
52. Id. at 135.
53. Id.
54. "Hutchinson at no time assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question
of concern about expenditures." Id.
55. W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16 (2003).

56.
57.

Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 159 (1979).
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"Soviet agent."58 Both accusations were untrue. Rather, Wolston had
merely been found guilty of contempt of court for failing to appear at a
hearing relating to Soviet espionage. 9
The Supreme Court held that Wolston was a private figure.60 Far
from voluntarily injecting or thrusting himself into a public controversy,
the Court noted that it would be more accurate to say that Wolston was
"dragged unwillingly into the controversy." 6 1 The Court emphasized the
need to look to the "nature and extent of [Wolston's] participation in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation." 62 Since Wolston
never discussed this matter with the media and limited his involvement
to only that necessary to defend against the contempt charge, the Court
concluded that he only played a "minor role" in whatever public
controversy surrounded the espionage investigation.63 The Court
refused to hold that such tangential involvement in a controversy-even
a controversy of public concern-was sufficient to transform Wolston
into a public figure.64 The Court further rejected the argument that
engaging in criminal conduct automatically confers public figure status,
thus again emphasizing that it is the "nature and extent" of one's
involvement in the public controversy that is determinative of public
figure status. 6 5
C. The Supreme Court andDefamation: The Status of the Involuntary
Public Figure
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the Court reached its
decisions in Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston without ever
addressing the possibility that any of the defamation plaintiffs in those
cases were involuntary public figures. Since the Court failed to address
the involuntary public figure doctrine in each of these cases, even
though each arguably presented the Court with an opportunity to do so,
one might ask whether these decisions preclude the doctrine's existence.
Several commentators argue that they have not. Their reasoning is
persuasive.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 162-63.
60. Id. at 166.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 167 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974)).
63. Id.
64. Id ("[Wolston's] failure to appear before the grand jury and citation for contempt no
doubt were 'newsworthy,' but the simple fact that these events attracted media attention also is
not conclusive of the public-figure issue."). See also Hopkins, supra note 55, at 17 (arguing that
the "clear implication" of Wolston was that "public figures must be more than tangentially
involved in public controversies").
65. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168-69.
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One commentator argues that the Court in these three cases "focused
on issues it obviously believed trumped involuntary public figure
status." 66 In Firestone, the Court held that the divorce proceeding was
not a matter of "concern," thus rendering the status of the defamation
plaintiff irrelevant67 One cannot become a public figure, voluntary or
otherwise, without a matter of public concern upon which to base the
public figure status.
In Hutchinson, the "bootstrapping" issue precluded the Court from
addressing the involuntary public figure doctrine; since defendants
cannot create a public controversy and then use that controversy as a
defense to a libel action, the Court did not need to fully address
Hutchinson's public figure status. 68
Finally, an initial reading of Wolston may appear to suggest that the
Court rejected the involuntary public figure doctrine when it stated that
Wolston was not a public figure because he had been "dragged
unwillingly into the controversy."6 9 But the Court never actually
reached the question of whether Wolston was an involuntary public
figure because Wolston 'played only a minor role' in a public
controversy." 70 A plausible reading of this holding is that public figures,
voluntary or otherwise "must be more than tangentially involved in the
public controver[sy]." What if Wolston had played a major role in the
controversy, for example, because it turned out he actually was a Soviet
spy? This would not have changed the fact that he was "dragged
unwillingly into the controversy." But would it have changed the
outcome of the case? The Court's ruling in Wolston does not answer
this question.
Because the Court's defamation decisions do not address when, if
ever, an individual can become an involuntary public figure, it becomes
necessary to turn elsewhere for an answer to the question this Article
poses.
II. INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE IN LOWER COURTS

Because the Supreme Court has yet to expound upon the involuntary
public figure doctrine, it is instructive to look to how lower courts have
66. Hopkins, supranote 55, at 15-16.
67. Id. at 16
68. Id. See also Sanchez-Arango, supra note 3, at 225 ("The Court principally rejected
Hutchinson as a candidate for public figure status because the claim amounted to little more
than bootstrapping.").
69. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., 445 U.S. 157, 166 (1979).
70. Hopkins, supra note 55, at 16.
71. Id. at 17.
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handled the doctrine. A number of lower courts have held that
defamation plaintiffs can become public figures involuntary-but not
all courts agree. This Part explores cases that have come out on both
sides of the involuntary public figure question and argues that
involuntary public figures are sometimes necessary in order to protect
First Amendment rights.
A. Lower Courts Supporting the Involuntary PublicFigureDoctrine
One of the first cases to address the involuntary public figure
doctrine was Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press.72 Trans
World was a debt collection agency and was under investigation by the
FTC for unfair and deceptive loan practices.7 3 At the same time, the
FTC was also investigating several other debt collection agencies for
similar infractions.7 4 Ultimately, the FTC distributed a press release
announcing its intent to file complaints against Trans World and the
other debt collection agencies. Though the release stated that it
intended to file complaints covering four types of infractions, the
release also noted that two of the charges would not be made against
Trans World.7 6 When AP reported on the press release, it failed to
indicate that Trans World was not being charged with all four
infractions. Trans World sued AP for libel.
The district court held that Trans World was a public figure for
purposes of its libel suit against AP and thus had to prove actual
malice. 79 The court began its analysis by acknowledging that Trans
World had not donned the public figure mantle voluntarily: "[Trans
World] cannot be said to have become a public figure by having
achieved 'pervasive fame or notoriety.' Nor can it be said that it
'voluntarily
inject[ed]
[it]self. . . into
a particular
public
80
controversy.", But the court recognized that these are not the only
ways one can become a public figure: "Gertz [also] recognize[d] that a
person may become a public figure for a limited range of issues by
having been 'drawn into a particular public controversy.""' A public
controversy certainly existed in this case: the FTC found that Trans
72. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
73. Id at 817.
74. Id
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 819-22.
80. Id. at 819 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (alteration
in original)).
81. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
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World's debt collection practices posed a significant enough risk to the
general public to consider lodging official charges against it. 82 The court
distinguished this case from Firestone,which involved a marital dispute
between private parties,83 and Gertz, where the plaintiff attorney
represented a client in a private lawsuit and was not involved in any of
the public activities relating to the murder. 84
Having established that a public controversy existed, the court went
on to explain how Trans World's involvement in the controversy
transformed it into a public figure.85 It noted that part of the FTC's
effectiveness draws from the publicity that attends the issuance of its
proposed complaints, which serves to both alert the public and motivate
the offender to quickly remedy its infractions. 86 Thus, although
Trans World may not have been a "public figure" until the
proposed complaint issued[,] ...

it was clearly drawn into a

particular controversy having its origin in Trans World's own
conduct and activities and thereby became a public figure for the
limited range of issues relating to the FTC's complaint.
Therefore, the FTC complaint turned Trans World into a public
figure despite the fact that Trans World did not voluntarily assume the
risks attendant to public figure status.
Implicit in this ruling seems to be the conclusion that, once an
official body publicly lodges a complaint against a person or entity, that
complaint creates a public controversy and that person/entity becomes a
public figure for the limited purpose of issues surrounding that
complaint. A ruling to the contrary would inhibit public discourse on an
issue of public concem.88
Several years after Trans World, the D.C. Circuit weighed in on the
involuntary public figure question in Dameron v. Washington
Magazine, Inc.89 Dameron was the lone air traffic controller on duty at
Dulles International Airport during a fatal crash landing in 1974.90 Eight
years later, the Washingtonian published an article suggesting that
Dameron was partly to blame for the crash and Dameron sued for
libel. 9 '
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 821.
Id. at 820 (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)).
Id. at 821 n.4 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. 323) (emphasis added).
See id. at 820-21.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
See id at 820 n.2.
779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 737-38.
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The D.C. Circuit held that Dameron was a public figure.92 Although
Dameron did not "inject" himself into a public controversy, the court
noted that this one factor "is not the be-all and end-all of public figure
status."9 3 In this case, Dameron was an involuntary public figure:
Injection is not the only means by which public-figure status is
achieved. Persons can become involved in public controversies
and affairs without their consent or will. Air-controller Dameron,
who had the misfortune to have a tragedy occur on his watch, is
such a person. We conclude that Dameron did become an
involuntary public figure for the limited purpose of discussions of
the [plane] crash. 94
The court recognized that, typically, a central part of the limitedpurpose public figure analysis is "an inquiry into the plaintiffs
voluntary actions that have caused him to become embroiled in a public
controversy" in order to determine whether the plaintiff played a
"sufficiently central role in that controversy." 95 But this analysis must
sometimes be modified to accommodate the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement that, in rare cases, an individual may become a public
figure involuntarily. 96 Dameron's case was one of these rare situations.
Though it was by "sheer bad luck," Dameron "assume[d] [a] special
prominence in the resolution of [a] public question."97 He "was at the
center of a controversy involving the loss of many lives in a mishap
involving ... the management of a program administered by the FAA,
an arm of the government." 98 Dameron also appeared at FAA hearings
following the crash. 99 Such circumstances were sufficient for a finding
that Dameron had become a public figure involuntarily: "[L]ike it or
not, Dameron was embroiled in a public controversy."' 00
As in Trans World, the D.C. Circuit took care to distinguish
Dameron from Supreme Court precedent.' 0 Unlike Firestone, much
more than mere newsworthiness made the plane crash a public
92. Id at 743.
93. Id at 740-41.
94. Id at 741.
95. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974);
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Pubs., Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
96. Id. at 741-42 ("In Gertz the Supreme Court noted that it is 'possible to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of [one's] own' although it added that 'the instances
of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."' (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345)).
97. Id. at 742 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
98. Id
99. Id.
100. Id. at 742-43.
101. Id
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controversy.102 It involved significant loss of human life that may have
been caused by mismanagement of a government agency. 0 3 The court
also distinguished this case from Wolston, noting that Wolston "was not
defamed with respect to the controversy in which he played a central
role-his refusal to testify before a grand jury-but rather with respect
to a controversy in which he played a role that was04 at most tangentialthe investigation of Soviet espionage in general."1
The Georgia Court of Appeals has also contributed to the
involuntary public figure discussion. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v.
Jewell centered on Richard Jewell, the security guard who discovered a
bomb in Atlanta's Centennial Park during the 1996 Olympics and
In the days and weeks
helped lead the evacuation of spectators.
following the incident, Jewell was interviewed by a number of media
outlets and appeared on TV several times. 6 Jewell was also
investigated by the FBI as a suspect in the bombing, but was ultimately
cleared of any involvement. 0 7 During the FBI investigation, a local
newspaper ran a number of articles implying that Jewell was guilty of
the bombing.o Jewell sued the paper for libel.109
The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that Jewell was an
"involuntary limited-purpose public figure.""10 The court noted that,
"[o]ccasionally, someone is caught up in [a] controversy involuntarily
and, against his will, assumes a prominent position in its outcome."
Like the plaintiff in Dameron, Jewell was an ordinary citizen unknown
to the general public before the Olympic bombing.1 2 But, like it or not,
Jewell became a "central figure" in the controversy surrounding the
park bombing and public safety.'" 3 One who assumes such a central role
in a public controversy is a public figure, whether they assumed such
status voluntarily or not.114
B. Lower CourtsRejecting the InvoluntaryPublicFigureDoctrine
Despite the cases just discussed, some lower courts-most notably
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743 (citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
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the Fourth Circuit-do not abide by the involuntary public figure
doctrine. For instance, the Fourth Circuit appeared to reject the doctrine
in Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.' Foretich involved a highly
publicized custody battle between Doctors Elizabeth Morgan and Eric
A. Foretich over their daughter, Hilary.1 16 During the course of the
battle, Morgan accused Foretich and Foretich's parents (Hilary's
grandparents) of sexually abusing Hilary." 7 Morgan ultimately lost a
civil case against Foretich and his parents, but persisted in refusing to
permit them to see Hilary.' As a result, Morgan was held in contempt
of court and sentenced to 25 months in jail.119 Morgan's jailing
"generated a torrent of publicity.... Hundreds of newspaper and
magazine articles were published about virtually every aspect of the
controversy. The broadcast media devoted extensive coverage to the
dispute and to the various public policy debates that it inspired." 20
Indeed, the controversy drew so much publicity that it inspired the
passage of a federal law limiting the amount of time one can be held in
jail for contempt of court.' 2 1
During this controversy Foretich's parents were frequently
mentioned in news reports. 2 They even appeared in the news on
several occasions to defend themselves against Morgan's allegations of

child abuse.1 23
Years later, ABC broadcast a docudrama about the custody battle.124
The docudrama strongly implied that Foretich and his parents had
abused Hilary.125 Foretich's parents sued ABC for defamation.1 26 A
district court held that Foretich's parents were private figures and ruled
in their favor.127 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.128 The court
began by holding that the custody battle was a public controversy
because it had "foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons
beyond its immediate participants." 29 The custody battle "heightened
115. 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 1543.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1544.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1545.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1549.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1541.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1555 (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Pubs., Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292, 1296
(D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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social awareness" of child-abuse allegations, the unfortunate realities of
custody battles, and even prompted the passage of a new federal law.130
But despite finding the presence of a public controversy, the court
held that Foretich's parents were private figures.'31 In seemingly
contradictory reasoning, the court noted that Gertz divided public
figures into three categories, including "'involuntary public figures,'
who become public figures through no purposeful action of their
own,"l 32 but then stated that, in determining public figure status, it must
ask "whether the plaintiff ha[d] voluntarily assumed a role of special
prominence in a public controversy by attempting to influence the
outcome of the controversy."' 3 3 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
Foretich's parents were not public figures because they did not
"voluntarily assume a role of special prominence in the MorganForetich controversy in order to influence its outcome."' 34 Despite
conceding that Gertz recognized the involuntary public figure doctrine,
the court did not even consider whether Foretich's parents had become
public figures involuntarily.13 5
The Fourth Circuit continued to eschew the involuntary public figure
doctrine in Wells v. Liddy.136 This case revolved around G. Gordon
Liddy's theory regarding the true purpose of the 1972 Watergate
burglary.137 The commonly accepted theory is that the burglars were
targeting the office of Larry O'Brien, the Chairman of the DNC. 138 But
Liddy and others contend that the break-in's true purpose was to obtain
information about a call-girl ring being run out of the DNC.19 While
this is not a widely accepted theory, it is a long-standing theory for
which there is at least some corroborating evidence.140 Liddy's theory
essentially boiled down to a belief that the burglary's true aim was to
break into the desk of a DNC secretary-Ida Wells-from which Liddy
believed the call girl ring was being organized.141 Liddy espoused this
theory in several speeches, on the Internet, and on the radio.142 Wells
130. Id.
131. Id at 1541.
132. Id. at 1551 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
133. Id. at 1553 (quoting Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir.
1991) (emphasis added)).
134. Id. at 1556.
135. Indeed, the word "involuntary" only appears two times in the entire opinion and both
times it is part of a quote from Gertz. Id. at 1551-52.
136. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 512.
138. Sanchez-Arango, supra note 3, at 214.
139. Id. at 214-16.
140. See generallyid.
141. Wells v. Liddy, I F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (D. Md. 1998).
142. Id.

376

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 24

sued him for defamation.143
The Fourth Circuit held that Wells was not a public figureinvoluntary or otherwise.144 Staying true to the reasoning in Foretich,
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had identified
"involuntary public figures" as a type of public figure, but went on to
hold that even involuntary public figures must assume the risk of
publicity.145 Under this reasoning, Wells was not an involuntary public
figure because she was not a "central figure in media reports on
Watergate.... In the eat wealth of materials on Watergate, [she was],
at most, a footnote." 6 The court was hesitant to base public figure
status on "sheer bad luck," noting that such reasoning would risk a
return to the rejected reasoning of Rosenbloom.14 7
C. Who is Right?
There is clear disagreement over how to treat the involuntary public
figure doctrine. This Article encourages the Supreme Court to adopt the
reasoning of cases like Trans World, Dameron, and Jewell.148 These
cases further the First Amendment's goal of promoting a "common
quest for truth" across a broad "spectrum of ideas and topics",l49 by
recognizing that the actual malice standard is necessary to protect
debate on public issues. 5 0 The right of every citizen to comment and
engage in debate on matters of public concern is a freedom that lies at
the very core of democratic society. It is important to ensure that our
laws do not deter citizens from exercising this freedom. The actual
malice standard does this by limiting the amount of second-guessing
speakers must engage in before commenting on public controversies.
Under the actual malice standard, statements made in good faith, even if
not fully informed, are protected from defamation liability.'' Such a
standard encourages citizens to engage in debate on matters of public
concern, thus promoting citizen involvement in the democratic
143. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 1999).
144. Id. at 505.
145. Id. at 540.
146. Id. at 540-41 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 539-40 (citing Dameron v. Wash. Mag., Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
See also supra text accompanying note 23 (discussing Rosenbloom).
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. SMOLLA, supra note 12, § 1:29.
150. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); Hopkins, supranote 55, at 47.
151. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974) (actual malice
requires "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication"). Mere failure to double-check the accuracy of a
statement is insufficient for a finding of actual malice. Id. (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287-88).
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process.152
By comparison, when mere negligence is the standard applied to
speech, citizens will more frequently stop and ask, "Do I know enough
about this issue to comment on it?" As soon as such questions are
asked, speech rights are chilled.153 Though such a limit on speech rights
may not always be undesirable, for instance, in defamation cases
between private figures involving matters of private concern, such a
chilling effect is ill-advised when it comes to comment on matters of
public concern. Society cannot hope to encourage its citizens to engage
in public debate if its laws result in citizens having to think twice before
they speak.154 As such, the mere fact that a participant's involvement in
a public controversy is involuntary should not be the sole deciding
factor in determining what standard applies in defamation cases.' 55 A
public controversy warranting free public comment can exist regardless
of whether direct participants' involvement is voluntary or not.
Voluntary "injection" of oneself into a public controversy should not be
the "be-all and end-all of public figure status."1 56
Take Dameron, for instance, in which an airplane crashed, resulting
in the tragic loss of a great many lives.' 5 7 In the wake of the accident, it
came to light that problems with FAA regulation may have been partly
to blame for the crash. ' Such a controversy involving a government
agency is certainly a matter of public concern and thus an issue on
which the First Amendment seeks to promote public debate.1 59 Once a
152. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 55, at 47 ("A rule ... protecting discussion of [matters
of public concern] and the people significantly involved in such issues is mandated by the
commitment of the First Amendment to self-government.").
153. See, e.g., Kimberly Caswell, Soldiers of Misfortune: Holding Media Defendants
Liable for the Effects of Their Commercial Speech, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 230 (1989) ("[A]
decision to allow a negligence cause of action may chill protected speech."). It is much easier to
be found liable under a simple negligence standard, than more demanding standards such as
actual malice. This specter of civil liability and the potentially large jury verdicts that
accompany deter citizens from speaking, thus chilling speech rights. Id.
154. See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-79 (addressing the adverse First Amendment
consequences of laws that result in such "self-censorship").
155. This reasoning mirrors that used by the Court in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 154 (1967) when it determined that public figures are in the same league as public officials:
The public's interest in matters of public concern is no less great when a public figure is
involved than when a public official is involved. Extending this logic, the public's interest in
matters of public concern is no less great simply because a central figure in that matter becomes
so involuntarily.
156. Dameron v. Wash. Mag., Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
157. Id. at 737.
158. Id. at 742.
159. See, e.g., Johnson v. Multnomah Cnty., Or., 48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1995)
("[M]isuse of public funds, wastefulness, and inefficiency in managing and operating
government entities are matters of inherent public concern." (quoting Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)).
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court has established that a matter of public concern exists, the
protection of citizens' freedom to comment on such matters should
come first and foremost in any subsequent First Amendment analysis.
This is not to say we should return to the rule of Rosenbloom.160 Rather,
it is simply to say that First Amendment analysis should not always
begin and end with the question of whether a participant's involvement
in a matter of public concern was voluntary.
While the fact that a participant's involvement in a public
controversy was involuntary should certainly factor into the analysis,
that factor alone should not lead to a per se application of the negligence
standard. Such a per se rule would overlook the fact that there is
nonetheless still a public controversy on which citizens should feel free
to comment. Courts that apply such a per se rule (i.e., those courts that
reject the involuntary public figure doctrine) are thus focusing their
First Amendment analysis too narrowly. The question should not be
"Was the participant's involvement in the controversy involuntary?" but
rather, "If the participant's involvement in the controversy was
involuntary, does the need to protect citizens' First Amendment rights
nevertheless demand application of the actual malice standard in this
case?" This latter question reflects an appropriate balancing of the
participant's interest in their reputation and the First Amendment rights
at issue-a balancing that the Supreme Court has recognized is
necessary and in which courts adopting the per se rule fail to engage.161
Dameron recognized that this latter question is the correct one,
noting that "[i]njection is not the only means by which public-figure
status is achieved." 6 2 In Dameron, the fact that the air traffic controller
was "embroiled in a public controversy" was sufficient for a finding that
he was a public figure.163 This implies that the need to protect public
comment on a matter of public concern outweighed the fact that the air
traffic controller's involvement in the controversy was involuntary.164
When one's participation in a public controversy is significant enough,
160. See supra text accompanying note 23. The Rosenbloom plurality held that any speech
involving matters of "public or general interest" should be governed by the New York Times
actual malice standard. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). This Article is
not arguing for such a blanket rule. Rather, it simply argues that if there is a matter of "public or
general concern," the fact that a participant's involvement in that matter is involuntary should
not automatically preclude application of the New York Times standard.
161. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (noting that the
approach taken in Gertz strikes the necessary balance between the First Amendment and states'
interest in protecting individuals' reputations).
162. Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741. See also similar statements in Trans World and Jewell.
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
163. Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.
164. Id
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the need to promote First Amendment debate on that controversy is
sufficiently strong to outweigh even the involuntary participant's
interest in protecting their reputation. 165
The reasoning of Dameron and like courts is further bolstered by the
fact that the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, for several reasons, is incorrect.
First, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is contradictory. It openly
acknowledges that the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of
involuntary public figures, yet still requires some voluntary action on
the part of the defamation plaintiff before they are labeled an
involuntary public figure. Though the Fourth Circuit pays lip service to
the involuntary public figure doctrine, its decisions essentially reject it
completely "by injecting the need for voluntariness into the 'involuntary
category."' 66 Such reasoning is inconsistent with Gertz, which notes
both that "it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own" and that one becomes a public
figure either by "voluntarily" injecting himself into a public controversy
or by being "drawn into a particular public controversy."' 67
Second, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is based on an incorrect
interpretation of case law. In Wells, the Fourth Circuit noted that one of
the rationales behind the actual malice standard is that "the public figure
has taken actions through which he has voluntarily assumed the risk of
publicity."1 6 8 While the Supreme Court did indeed say this, it also noted
that those who become public figures involuntarily would be an
exception to this rationale:
[I]t may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the
most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society.' 69
Note that the Court says "for the most part." Taken in context, this
language must mean that those individuals referenced in the previous
sentence (those who "become a public figure through no purposeful
action of [their] own") are an exception to the general rule. This
interpretation must be the correct one because such a caveat is necessary
in order for this passage of the Court's opinion to make sense. The
Court cannot be saying that public figure status always requires
voluntary action because it recognizes in the same paragraph that
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Sanchez-Arango, supra note 3, at 230.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 (1974) (emphasis added).
Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 539 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
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sometimes one can become a public figure without taking any
"purposeful action." Thus, the Fourth Circuit's premise that public
figure status requires an individual to "voluntarily assume[] the risk of
publicity" is incorrect.
The Fourth Circuit also incorrectly interprets cases that accept the
involuntary public figure doctrine. For instance, it worries that Dameron
was little more than a return to the Rosenbloom rule that was rejected by
the Court in Gertz.170 This interpretation of Dameron is incorrect.
Dameron still requires that the defamation plaintiff be more than
tangentially related to the public controversy. This rule is much
narrower than the Rosenbloom rule, which looked only to the nature of
the speech itself. Thus, under Rosenbloom, one who had absolutely no
relation to a public controversy would still have to satisfy the actual
malice standard if the person allegedly defaming them was commenting
on a matter of public concern. Dameron differs from this broad rule by
looking to the status of the defamation plaintiff and determining that
plaintiffs level of involvement in the public controversy.171
Finally, the Fourth Circuit errs by failing to identify the correct
public controversy. The Fourth Circuit held that Wells was not a public
figure because she was at most a "footnote" in the Watergate
controversy.172 But the Watergate controversy generally was not the
public controversy at issue in Wells. Rather, the public controversy was
the more specific question of the purpose of the burglary.' 73 Such a
question is still a matter of public concern, but is also a much different
controversy than Watergate in general. The Fourth Circuit's "footnote"
conclusion is arguably correct in the latter case, but most certainly
incorrect in the former one. In the former, Wells was a key player. The
burglars had a key to her desk and Liddy theorized that Wells was
helping to organize the call-girl ring.174 The Fourth Circuit's failure to
identify the correct public controversy caused it to incorrectly find that
Wells was only tangentially related to a public controversy.
In sum, the Supreme Court should explicitly recognize that
defamation plaintiffs can become public figures involuntarily. A per se
rule that involuntary participation in a public controversy requires
application of a negligence standard in defamation cases overlooks the
fact that there still exists a matter of public concern on which citizens
should be free to comment publicly. The involuntary public figure
170. Wells, 186 F.3d at 539.
171. See, e.g., Sanchez-Arango, supra note 3, at 232 ("[T]he Waldbaum-Dameron test
would exclude individuals who are only tangentially mentioned in media accounts or who
otherwise are simply too unimportant to be deemed a part of a controversy.").
172. Wells, 186 F.3d at 542.
173. See Hopkins, supra note 55, at 230.
174. Wells, 186 F.3d at 514, 517.
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doctrine leads to a more appropriate analysis by balancing the
participant's involuntary involvement against the First Amendment
rights at stake.

III. CRIMINAL

SUSPECTS AS INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURES

Having concluded that the Supreme Court should recognize the
involuntary public figure doctrine because it strikes an appropriate
balance between individual reputation and citizens' First Amendment
rights, we now turn back to the original question posed by this Article:
Should an individual who has been publicly recognized by a law
enforcement official as a criminal suspect be classified as an
involuntary public figure? Simply acknowledging that involuntary
public figure status is a possibility does not answer this question; deeper
analysis is required.
One thing that becomes clear upon review of both Supreme Court
and lower court jurisprudence is that there are three prerequisites to a
holding that a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure,
involuntary or otherwise. First, there must be a "Public controversy"
upon which public figure status can be predicated." Second, if there is
such a public controversy, the defamation plaintiffs involvement in that
controversy must be more than merely tangential.1 76 Third, the allegedly
defamatory comment must be "germane" to the plaintiffs involvement
in the controversy.17 7 In order to answer this Article's central question,
we must determine whether the criminal suspect in that question
satisfies all three of these requirements. This final Section argues that he
does.

175. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (holding that individuals
most often become public figures by "thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies" (emphasis added)); Dameron v. Wash. Mag., Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (noting that the first step in its limited-purpose public figure analysis is to "determine that
there is a public controversy" (emphasis added) (citing Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc. 627
F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S 898 (1980)).
176. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (noting that all public figures "assume special prominence
in the resolution of public questions"); Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741 ("[T]his court [uses] a threepart framework for analyzing whether someone has become a limited-purpose public figure.
Under this test the court must determine that there is a public controversy; ascertain that the
plaintiff played a sufficiently central role in that controversy; and find that the alleged
defamation was germane to the plaintiffs involvement in the controversy." (emphasis added));
see also Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 534 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Before a plaintiff can be
classified . .. as a limited-purpose public figure, the defendant must prove that [the plaintiff] . ..
assumed a role of special prominence in the public controversy.").
177. See, e.g., Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741.
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A. Public Controversy
Before one can be deemed any kind of public figure, there must be a
public controversy upon which public figure status can be based.' 7 8 As
such, there must be a public controversy before Rex, the murder suspect
from the Introduction, can be said to be a public figure. Courts are
virtually unanimous in requiring that an event's resolution have an
impact on people who are not direct participants in order for the
controversy to be a "public controversy."179 Thus, a public controversy
existed in Dameron because loss of life that was potentially due to
deficiencies in the FAA raised questions about government regulation,
the resolution of which would impact the general public. 80 Similarly,
the questions of FTC regulation raised in Trans World and general
public safety in Jewell were public controversies because the resolution
of each of those controversies would have impacts on society in general,
not just the direct participants in those controversies. Even the Fourth
Circuit in Foretich concluded that the controversy that arose out of the
custody battle was a public controversy; it raised social awareness of
child abuse and custody issues and even resulted in the passage of a new
federal law.' 8
Rex's situation is comparable to these situations. When a law
enforcement official publicly identifies an individual as a suspect in an
ongoing criminal investigation, the subsequent resolution of that
investigation will have effects on society in general, not just those
directly involved in the investigation. As Justice Brennan once
observed, the judicial process, as with the other branches of
government, must be "subject[] ... to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism."18 2 A primary reason for this is that "mismanagement in the
criminal justice system, and the resulting potential threat to the public,
is a matter of public concern." 83 In short, a law enforcement official's
public recognition of an individual as a suspect in an ongoing criminal
178. That is, unless the person is in that select category of individuals who are public
figures for all purposes. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The murder suspect in this Article's central
question is not such a person.
179. See, e.g., Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 534 n.24 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
Watergate was a "public controversy" because it is "an event that has evoked extensive political
and historical interest and debate and has had effects felt well beyond the direct participants");
Bay View Packing v. Taff Co., 543 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]f the issue was
being debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants, it was a public controversy." (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297)).
180. Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.
181. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1555 (4th Cir. 1994).
182. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 477 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S 333, 350 (1966)).
183. Bonomi v. Gaddini, 11 Fed. App'x 832, 833 (9th Cir. 2001).
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investigation implicates the "public interest in a fair and effective
criminal justice system.', 84 Citizens not directly involved in a criminal
investigation still have an interest in the perpetrator being brought to
justice. Public confidence in the criminal justice system is shaken when
a criminal is not brought to justice and such results may suggest the
need for reform. Such circumstances are most certainly within the ambit
of issues that can have "foreseeable and substantial ramifications for
non-participants."' 8 5 As such, once the district attorney publicly
identified Rex as a suspect in John's murder, a public controversy was
created.
B. The Importance of Correctly Defining the Controversy
Before moving onto the second prong of the analysis (the plaintiffs
involvement in the public controversy), an issue related to determining
the public controversy at issue warrants discussion.
As was just established, the public interest in the criminal justice
system's fair and effective resolution of criminal investigations creates a
public controversy when a law enforcement official publicly identifies
an individual as a criminal suspect. But the observant reader may have
noted that this is not the only possible way to frame the controversy.
Arguably, there is also a narrower controversy at issue: who committed
the specific criminal act? But when it comes time to determine a
suspect's involvement in this narrower controversy, a significant
problem arises. The suspect's degree of involvement in the controversy
is unknown because he is just that, a suspect, not a known criminal
perpetrator. If the suspect did indeed commit the criminal act, then
clearly he played a significant role in the controversy and perhaps is
even a voluntary public figure for purposes of public comment on the
criminal act. On the other hand, if the suspect is actually innocent, then
he almost certainly had no involvement in the controversy and thus
would not be a public figure at all.
This circumstance demonstrates the importance of determining the
precise scope of the public controversy. Both courts and commentators
have recognized this importance.' 86 Focusing on a controversy that is
either too narrow or too broad can lead to incorrect public figure
determinations. Recall that this was one of the pitfalls that befell the

184. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 155-56 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
185. Silvester v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1988).
186. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 n.27 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (noting the importance of defining the controversy either "narrowly or broadly");
Sanchez-Arango, supra note 3, at 232 ("[A]n error in this area [determining whether there is a
controversy] can be outcome-determinative.").
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Fourth Circuit in Wells v. Liddy.'
Rather than focusing on the
narrower controversy over the purported existence of a call-girl ring in
the DNC, the court instead framed the controversy as the much broader
Watergate scandal. Clearly in the latter controversy, a mere secretary at
the DNC played little part in the scandal that resulted in President
Nixon's resignation. But in the former controversy-which was actually
the controversy at issue in the case-that secretary may have played a
pivotal role in organizing the call-girl ring. This is a vital point and one
which courts determining questions of public figure status must be
cognizant.
The problem posed in the Introduction demonstrates this principle.
Defining the public controversy too narrowly (i.e., "Who killed John?"
or "Who broke the law prohibiting murder?") both leads to an
impossible public figure determination and also ignores the more
general public interest in fair and effective criminal law enforcement.
The broader public controversy created by the district attorney's public
identification of Rex as a suspect in the murder investigation, which
implicates several issues of public concern, is thus the appropriate
public controversy for a court to use in this case. 88
C. Involvement in the Public Controversy
Having established that a public controversy does in fact exist when
a law enforcement official publicly identifies an individual as a criminal
suspect, the public figure inquiry turns to the nature of that individual's
involvement in that public controversy. This is where the involuntary
public figure doctrine is of vital importance to resolving this Article's
central question. Certainly Rex did not voluntarily become involved in
the criminal investigation of which he is a part. Nonetheless, as the lead
suspect in the district attorney's investigation of John's murder, Rex is a
central figure in the public controversy arising out of that criminal
investigation. As cases that utilize the involuntary public figure doctrine
demonstrate, Rex's role as a central player in a public controversy
would likely be sufficient for a finding that he is an involuntary public
figure for purposes of public comment on the criminal investigation.
For example, just as Richard Jewell was an involuntary public figure
because he "played a central, albeit possibly involuntary, role in the
controversy over Olympic Park safety" and became "embroiled in the
ensuing discussion and controversy over park safety," 89 Rex plays a
central role in the controversy over effective criminal law enforcement
and is certainly embroiled in any discussion relating to that controversy.
187.
188.
189.

See supraPart II.C.
See supraPart III.A.
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
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Similar analogies can be drawn between Rex's situation and the other
involuntary public figure cases discussed in this Article.190 In
jurisdictions where the involuntary public figure doctrine is already
accepted, this would likely be the end of the analysis. Rex would be
deemed an involuntary public figure and would have to prove that Alex
acted with actual malice. But since uncertainty about the involuntary
public figure doctrine continues to exist in many of this country's
jurisdictions, further explanation and support of this result will be useful
to help courts analyze involuntary public figure questions correctly.
Both state law and sound policy arguments provide such explanation
and support.
1. State Anti-SLAPP Laws
Under the laws of many states, Rex's defamation suit against Alex is
likely already an impermissible infringement upon Alex's free speech
rights. Many states recognize the potentially chilling effects of lawsuits
that discourage citizens from publicly commenting on public issues.
Such suits are termed "strategic lawsuits against public participation"
(SLAPP) and laws prohibiting such lawsuits as "Anti-SLAPP" laws.'91
More than half of the states have adopted such laws.192 The goal of antiSLAPP laws is to prevent claimants from bringing lawsuits against
individuals who are exercising their right of free speech "in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by [a governmental or
official proceeding]" or their "right to petition government for a redress

of grievances."'

93

Under such laws, a lawsuit by a criminal suspect in an ongoing
criminal investigation against a private citizen who commented on that
individual's involvement in the criminal investigation would likely be
dismissed. This is so because the private individual's speech is "in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by [a
governmental or official proceeding]" and thus within the ambit of antiSLAPP laws. At least one court has explicitly accepted this result. In
Hindu Temple & Community Center of the High Desert, Inc. v.
Raghunathan,the Hindu Temple was under investigation for running a
credit card scam.1 94 Hindu Temple sued Raghunathan after he told law
190. See supraPart II.A.
191. GuardingAgainst the Chill: A Survival Guidefor SLAPP Victims, FIRST AMENDMENT
PROJECT,
http://www.thefirstamendment.org/antislappresourcecenter.html#What%20are%20
slapps (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
192.

State

Anti-SLAPP

Laws,

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION

PROJECT,

http://www.anti-

slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
193. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-11.1(b)-(c) (2012). Other state anti-SLAPP laws contain
virtually identical wording. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16(b)(1), (e) (2009).
194. 714 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
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enforcement officials that Hindu Temple had made unauthorized
charges to his credit card.195 A Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the
suit under Georgia's anti-SLAPP law because Raghunathan's statement
had been "made in furtherance of an ongoin investigation regarding
[Hindu Temple's] alleged criminal activity."
Because "[s]uch speech
is in furtherance of the right . . . to petition government for a redress of

grievances [it] thus represent[ed] the type of speech that the anti-SLAPP
statute is designed to protect."
Under such reasoning, Alex would be protected from Rex's
defamation lawsuit if he lived in a state with an anti-SLAPP statute.
Alex's comments about Rex were "made in furtherance of an ongoing
investigation regarding [Rex's] alleged criminal activity" and as such
were "in furtherance of [Alex's] right ... to petition government for a
redress of Frievances," therefore qualifying them for anti-SLAPP
protection.' 9 This is not to say that state anti-SLAPP laws are a
sufficient substitute for protecting Alex's First Amendment rights, for
citizens should not have to depend on state law to protect their
constitutional rights.' 99 But the fact that Rex's defamation lawsuit
against Alex would be dismissed under the laws of more than half the
states certainly provides support for a finding that Rex, at the very least,
should have to satisfy a higher burden of proof in order to prevail in his
suit against Alex.
2. Reduced Need to Protect Reputation
Several of the policy arguments for requiring public figures to satisfy
a higher standard of proof in defamation cases equally support requiring
individuals who have been identified as criminal suspects by law
enforcement officials to satisfy the actual malice standard. Three policy
arguments underlie the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz: (1)
individuals' right to protect their reputations from falsehoods sometimes
trump others' First Amendment rights; (2) public figures have ready
access to media and thus can more easily combat falsehoods than
private figures; and (3) public figures, by stepping into the public
spotlight, have assumed the risk of being negligently defamed. 0 0 As
195. Id. at 629.
196. Id. at 632.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) ("We have never
intimated. . . [that] the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular
State in which the search occurs."); Christopher v. Nestlerode, 373 F. Supp. 2d 503, 513 (M.D.
Pa. 2005) ("Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Constitution as a whole depends upon the
law of a single state for substantive meaning."), aff'd, 240 F. App'x 481 (3d Cir. 2007).
200. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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discussed previously, this third policy argument does not work in the
involuntary public figure context. 20 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court seemed
to recognize this in Gertz.202 The remaining two policy considerations
support a holding that individuals who have been publicly identified by
law enforcement officials as criminal suspects are public figures.
First, the need to protect First Amendment rights should win out
over the right of such individuals to protect their reputations. Any
damage done to their reputation by comments following the official's
proclamation is de minimis in comparison to the harm already inflicted
by that proclamation. Second, such individuals likely have the increased
access to media that the Supreme Court has recognized as supporting a
higher burden of proof requirement.203
Reputation. It is important to remember that the existence of a
defamation cause of action is a restriction of free speech rights. 204
Defamation laws discourage citizens from engaging in certain types of
speech and thus, to a certain extent, have a chilling effect on free speech
rights. Such limitation is warranted in certain situations, because
society, in addition to valuing speech rights, also values individuals'
right to protect their reputations from false statements. Thus, the
Supreme Court in Gertz justified its holding-namely, that public
figures must satisfy a higher standard than private figures in defamation
suits-as recognizing "the strong and legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation." 205
This principle is illustrated by the typical defamation suit. B, an
ordinary private citizen, makes a false statement about A in a public
place that many people overhear. Wishing to protect his reputation, A
sues B for slander. In such a defamation suit between two private
persons, A, in order to prevail in his defamation suit for compensatory
damages, would simply have to prove that B acted with negligence in
making the false statement. A is only required to satisfy this lesser
standard because defamation law recognizes that private citizens have
an interest in protecting their reputations from false statements-an
interest that is so strong that it warrants placing a limit on free speech
rights.
But when it comes to a private citizen being sued for defamation by
201. See supra Part II.C.
202. Id.
203. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-44.
204. See, e.g., Eric M. Jacobs, Comment, Protecting the First Amendment Right to
Petition: Immunity for Defendants in Defamation Actions through Application of the NoerrPennington Doctrine, 31 Am. U. L. Ruv. 147, 168 (1981) ("The Court found that an action for
defamation does limit free speech rights, and consequently developed the New York Times-Gertz
standard of liability.").
205. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
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an individual who has been publicly identified by a law enforcement
official as a criminal suspect, the interest in protecting that individual's
reputation is not as strong. Enormous damage has already been done to
the criminal suspect's reputation by the law enforcement official's
announcement before any other comments about the criminal suspect
have been made. 206 The impact of subsequent comments by private
citizens regarding the individual's criminal status will have a relatively
insubstantial impact on that individual's reputation as compared to the
massive harm already inflicted by the official's public accusation.
Taking this Article's hypothetical as an example, is Rex's reputation
substantially more tarnished than it already has been by the district
attorney's pronouncement after Alex announces his agreement with the
district attorney? This seems unlikely. By the time Alex made his
comments, Rex had already been officially branded a criminal suspect.
Subsequent accusations of Rex's guilt would seem to pale in
comparison.
Accepting that Alex's comments have a relatively de minimis impact
on Rex's already tarnished reputation, finding that Rex is an involuntary
public figure, and thus must satisfy the actual malice standard, becomes
significantly more justified. The rule stating that private figures need
only prove negligence in defamation suits is predicated on the value
society places on protecting one's reputation from injurious falsehoods.
Indeed, society places such a high value on individual reputation that, at
least in the context of private figure defamation plaintiffs, the right to
protect one's reputation substantially trumps the defamation defendant's
First Amendment rights. But when it comes to the case of an individual
who has been publicly identified as a criminal suspect, the need to
protect that individual's reputation from subsequent harm becomes
much weaker because the public official's announcement has already
inflicted considerable damage to that individual's reputation. Thus, the
predicate upon which defamation law's limitation of First Amendment
rights is based is not nearly as strong in this context, while society's
interest in protecting First Amendment rights remains as strong as ever.
This being the case, the scales should tip back in favor of protecting
First Amendment rights.207 The way to provide greater protection to
First Amendment rights in the defamation arena is to find that the
206. Simply being accused of a criminal act can have serious repercussions for one's
reputation. For instance, our nation's grand jury system recognizes this by operating in secrecy
in order to "protect innocent criminal suspects from damage to their reputations." George T.
Marcou, GrandJury, 71 GEo. L.J. 475, 483 (1982).
207. This is not to say that the criminal suspect loses all right to protect his reputationcitizens are still prohibited from recklessly defaming the criminal suspect. Rather, the point here
is that, in the battle of right to reputation versus right to freedom of speech, free speech should,
absent recklessness on the part of the speaker, win out.
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defamation plaintiff is a public figure and thus must satisfy the actual
malice standard. Thus, Rex should be deemed a public figure who has
to prove actual malice. 20 8
Access to Media. The Supreme Court in Gertz also justified holding
public figures to a higher standard because they "usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements then private individuals normally enjoy."209 Public figures
require less protection from defamation law because they can quickly
respond to allegedly defamatory comments through mediums that reach
a broad audience, thus allowing them to repair their reputations through

self-help. 2 10
This justification holds equally true in the case of criminal suspects,
like Rex, who have been publicly recognized as such by a law
enforcement official. Once the law enforcement official makes his
announcement, media outlets will be clamoring to get the suspect's side
of the story.2 1 1 Any reporter or newscaster worth his salt would be
foolish to turn down an opportunity to speak to the suspect and report
on the suspect's side of the story. This gives the criminal suspect a
remedy for defamatory comments that everyday citizens simply do not
have. While this access to media may not be enough, in and of itself, to
justify placing a heightened standard of proof on the criminal suspect, 2 12
208. The author recognizes that this argument raises a significant question: if this line of
reasoning were indeed adopted, shouldn't the criminal suspect, if it turns out that he is actually
innocent, then have a cause of action against the law enforcement official? This question raises
several difficult questions, not the least of which being qualified immunity, that are beyond the
scope of this Article. For an interesting perspective and possible answers to similar questions,
see Kyu Ho Youm, Freedom of Expression and the Law: Rights and Responsibilities in South
Korea, 38 STAN J. INT'L L. 123, 125, 140-41 (2002). The Supreme Court has also briefly
addressed right to reply statutes. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969);
see also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan also suggested in his Gertz dissent that a statute "provid[ing] for an
action for retraction or for publication of a court's determination of falsity if the plaintiff is able
to demonstrate that false statements have been published concerning his activities" would be
constitutional. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
210. Id. ("The first remedy of any victim[] of defamation is self-help--using available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact
on reputation.").
211. Of course, the suspect's attorney will frequently discourage the suspect from making
statements to the media or the general public. But the suspect's increased access to the media
still remains. The suspect could release carefully worded statements to the press or could wait
until the criminal investigation has concluded before speaking out. Both courses of action are
not uncommon in today's society.
212. The Supreme Court noted in Gertz that
an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory
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when combined with the other factors discussed in this Part, it certainly
provides further justification for a finding that the suspect is an
involuntary public figure.
3. Consistency with Precedent
Briefly, it should also be noted that holding that the district
attorney's public identification of Rex as a criminal suspect makes Rex
an involuntary public figure is not at odds with the Supreme Court's
long-established holdings that neither mere involvement in litigation,
nor engaging in criminal activity, are enough for a finding of a public
controversy. The Court noted in Firestonethat it saw "little reason why
[participants in litigation] should substantially forfeit that degree of
protection which the law of defamation would otherwise afford them
simply by virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom."2 13 In Wolston,
it rejected the contention that "any person who engages in criminal
conduct automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of comment
on a limited range of issues relating to his conviction. 14
The case of Rex and other like criminal suspects can be
distinguished from these precedents. First, the Court's rule in Firestone
is not an absolute one. It recognized that "participants in some litigation
may be legitimate 'public figures."' 2 15 Further, the facts of Firestoneare
radically different from those in Rex's case. Firestone involved a
divorce suit between a husband and wife-a civil action. 216 Rex's case,
on the other hand, involves a serious criminal accusation. The
distinction here is clear. Civil actions are most often between private
parties over private affairs and thus less deserving of the First
Amendment's protection of free public comment. In contrast, Rex's
case is a serious criminal matter implicating issues of public concern
that warrants public comment.217 It is certainly more serious and of
falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the
truth rarely catches up with a lie. But the fact that the self-help remedy of
rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is
irrelevant to our inquiry.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
213. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976).
214. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc., Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979).
215. Firestone,424 U.S. at 457.
216. Id. at 450.
217. The Northern District of California agrees with this reasoning:
Neither the mere involvement in litigation nor the associated publicity where
the participants attract public interest is sufficient to turn litigants into public
figures. But as the Court there recognized, "participants in some litigation may
be legitimate 'public figures,' either generally or for the limited purpose of that
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much greater public concern than the "cause celebre" at issue in
Firestone.2 18 Thus, holding that Rex is a public figure does not conflict
with Firestone.
Wolston is also distinguishable. Like Firestone, Wolston does not
establish an absolute rule. It merely rejected the proposition that
criminal activity "automatically" turns one into a public figure. 219in
that case, Wolston was guilty of a relatively minor crime: contempt of
court. 2 20 Rex, on the other hand, is a murder suspect who has been
publicly identified as such by a law enforcement official. This situation
is a far cry from that in Wolston. While there is little need to provide
public comment on an individual's conviction for contempt of court
with greater protection than it receives under the negligence standard,
the public interests implicated by an ongoing criminal investigation into
a murder do warrant greater protection. At least one court has
acknowledged this distinction. 22 1 Therefore, Wolston does not preclude
Rex from being an involuntary public figure.
D. Comments Germane to Involvement in Public Controversy
The analysis throughout this Part has assumed that Alex's comments
about Rex were related to Rex's involvement in the public controversy
(the criminal investigation). It seems to the author that this factor will
rarely be a contentious one, but it should certainly be acknowledged in
order to emphasize an important point: involuntary public figures must
necessarily be limited-purpose public figures. As discussed throughout
litigation . . ." The litigation in this case was not a controversy between private
parties nor simply an action by the government over an issue essentially of
concern only to the government and the respondent. Instead, the proposed
complaint which was the subject of the publication here was the result of an
investigation into Trans World's business activities and reflected a
determination that some of those activities created a sufficient risk of harm to a
significant segment of the public that enforcement proceedings should be
instituted.
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (citing
Firestone,424 U.S. 448).
218. Firestone,424 U.S. at 454.
219. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168.
220. Id. at 163.
221. See Ruebke v. Globe Commc'ns Corp., 738 P.2d 1246 (Kan. 1987). In this case,
Ruebke was accused of a triple homicide and eventually charged. Globe reported on his
involvement in the murders and Ruebke sued for defamation. In finding that Ruebke was a
public figure, the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized Wolston, but held that the proper inquiry
was to determine the "nature and extent of [Ruebke's] participation in the controversy giving
rise to the [alleged] defamation." Id. at 1251 (citing Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167). The great "public
concern" surrounding the murders justified the court's finding that Ruebke was a public figure.
Ruebke, 738 P.2d at 1252.
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this Part, individuals become involuntary public figures by virtue of
their pivotal involvement in a particularpublic controversy. Although
they become a public figure involuntarily, they are only a public figure
for purposes of comment on the controversy in which they are involved.
The third and final step of the involuntary public figure analysis
recognizes this. By ensuring that the allegedly defamatory comment is
"germane" to the involuntary public figure's involvement in the
controversy, it ensures that that person is a public figure only for
purposes of the controversy in which they are involved.
The "germane" requirement is satisfied so long as the "primary
concern" of the allegedly defamatory comment is the "plaintiffs role"
in the public controversy.222 In this Article's hypothetical it is clear that
the "primary concern" of Alex's comments about Rex is Rex's
involvement in the criminal investigation. But say Alex had instead said
something like: "Rex puts rat poison in his hamburgers. No one should
ever eat at his restaurant. It is the worst restaurant in town." Comments
such as these would not be "germane" to the public controversy upon
which Rex's public figure status is based, meaning that if Rex sued
Alex over these comments, Rex would not have to prove actual malice.
This requirement thus ensures that involuntary public figures are still
able to protect their reputations in contexts outside the public
controversy in which they are involved.
CONCLUSION

It is time for the Supreme Court to definitively rule on the
involuntary public figure question. In order to adequately protect
citizens' First Amendment right to comment freely on matters of public
concern, the Court should recognize that there is a limited range of
circumstances where, even if a plaintiffs involvement in the matter is
involuntary, the New York Times actual malice standard should apply. A
situation where an individual has been publicly identified by a law
enforcement official as a suspect in a criminal investigation is one such
circumstance. Several factors justify the application of the involuntary
public figure doctrine in such a context.
First, a defamation suit brought by such a suspect is already likely to
be dismissed under many states' anti-SLAPP laws as an impermissible
infringement on free speech rights. Second, the policy arguments
justifying the requirement that public figures satisfy the actual malice
standard also support applying that standard to such criminal suspects.
Individuals who have been publicly identified as criminal suspects by
222. See Silvester v. Am. Broad. Co., 839 F.2d 1491, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988).
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law enforcement officials have already suffered immense harm to their
reputations. As such, the need to protect their reputations is not as great
as in the typical defamation case. This being the case, the ever present
need to protect First Amendment rights justifies imposing the actual
malice standard. Further, such criminal suspects have greatly increased
access to media with which they can combat allegedly defamatory
comments.
The involuntary public figure doctrine is necessary to protect the
First Amendment right of citizens like Alex to comment freely on
matters of public concern.
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